Introduction
Two students came up to me once at a conference in Europe at which pluralism in economics had been discussed, and said they believed people in the United States were quite religious, and asked was this possibly a reason why economists in the US were so strongly attached to standard economic theory?
Basically they were trying to tie something they understood broadly as a religious fundamentalism to something on the order of an economic fundamentalism, and thought that if there was a connection, this meant that pluralism in economics was not likely to find fertile soil in the US. I replied that I hadn't thought about the idea, and that I was skeptical that such an argument could be made in a persuasive way. If they meant that the views of American economists were to be explained by their being religious, then the view was too simple and likely wrong. I also thought there might be many reasons for what could be called an economic fundamentalism in the US, including a widely held commitment among many American economists to a neoliberal view of the world. But the question of a link between US economics and religion stuck with me. Subsequently I found that Robert Nelson (Nelson, 2001 ; see also Perlman, 2003) had been similarly provoked by the relationship between economics and religion in the US, and so I ultimately asked myself how this issue could conceivably be addressed. This brief comment is the result of that reflection. To begin, I asked myself why there was indeed so little support for pluralism in economics in the US, and then made a distinction between the nature and status of pluralism in economics.
Pluralism vs. anti-pluralism in economics
What is the nature and status of pluralism in economics? Its nature is not much disputed: it is widely agreed to be a methodological value that it is often believed ought to govern economists' practice vis-à-vis approaches to the subject matter of economics rival to their own, specifically, economists ought to Suppose, then, that anti-pluralism seen as a force operating in economics has two characteristics. First, it involves intransigent opposition to openness based on the need to defend specific deep conceptual structures which is disconnected from all reasonable debate over their coherence and epistemic value.
These 'untouchables,' as I will call them, are always defended, in one form or another, no matter what might be argued about them or what happens to the rest of the theory in which they operate. Imre Lakatos (1970) believe something like untouchable conceptual structures existed as the hard core of most scientific theories, though he did not seek to explain why they exist. Second, the meaning of these untouchable conceptual structures might be said to have a two-tier character: their surface meanings are shaped by the theories in which they operate, but they also possess further underlying meanings to which these surface meanings are related. These underlying meanings generally go unrecognized, so that conceptual elaboration is confined to the surface meanings, the defense of which, however, is motivated by attachment to their underlying meanings. The attachment to these underlying meanings makes their proponents' intransigent opposition to openness a matter of a force operating within science rather than an epistemic concern, and thus makes their opposition to others' views an antipluralism rather than a disagreement over methodological values. influenced by many things. Despite this, the standard view is that why people come to have the preferences they do is irrelevant to the explanation of choice which takes them as given in the act of choice. It is true, of course, that one can explain choice with given preferences without saying anything about the formation of those preferences. Their formation and the person's acting upon them are two different things. But if we know preferences are susceptible to being influenced, why would we think this is a good explanation of choice? Why shouldn't how preferences are formed be central to our explanations of the choices people make? The answer, I suggest, is that one would only think the standard view is a good explanation of choice if one was already convinced that people's actions must ultimately stem from them alone and that people are essentially autonomous.
To better understand this commitment to autonomy, we should note what the specific grounds are in standard theory for the idea that people are essentially autonomous. Thus, autonomy is justified by saying that individuals have their own separate utility functions (whatever might be the origins of their preferences). The basis for this claim is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function theorem (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , which says that if a specific set of logical assumptions regarding preferences is satisfied (completeness, transitivity, independence, and continuity), the individual has a well-defined preference ordering, which can be represented by a distinct (monotonic) individual utility function. That is, the well-orderedness of preferences implies personal autonomy (and vice versa).
Needless to say, there has been much experimental research in recent years that casts doubt on whether this set of logical assumptions can be said to apply to people's preferences. The subsequent development of the theory of rational choice further reinforces the autonomy-by-fiat approach. For example, despite their continued use of the utility function concept, most economists who use standard modeling use revealed preference theory to explain choice, and this allows them to deny that individual psychology has any relevance to the theory of choice (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008) . Revealed preference theory can be interpreted as claiming that choice reveals preferences, and thereby provides what economists believe to be an objective grounding for the idea that preference grounds the theory of demand. This justifies dropping any substantive reference to preference and personal psychology from the analysis of choice. It thereby compels us to say that choice is always autonomous choice, since nothing regarding how people might come to have the preferences they have can enter into its explanation. Choice is thus defined as the product of an autonomous individual. Note that the original justification for revealed preference theory was that individual psychology is unobservable, while one can observe people's choices (Samuelson, 1938) . But what counts as observable and unobservable can be subject to debate. Revealed preference theory puts off this debate by simply denying that human psychology, or for that matter anything, might condition choice.
The atomistic individual, then, is necessarily an autonomous being. counts as exogenous in the pursuit of ever more comprehensive accounts of systems of determination in economic life. In the face of this, it is surely odd that so many mainstream economists have remained for over a century unwilling to investigate the exogeneity of individual preferences, the basis for treating the individual as an autonomous being. Why this is so, I will now argue, is that the atomistic individual is foundational to their anti-pluralism. This is to say that these economists' position is not one rooted in reasoned debate over the merits of different approaches in economics, but is driven by forces and a transcendent God (at least in monotheism). Accordingly it is a doctrine which generally cannot be given up without at the same time giving up the religious commitment with which it is associated.
Consider, then, two main aspects of the individual human soul doctrine.
First, human souls are essentially individual. A person's relationship to God, as manifest in having a soul, is fully individual. This is so strongly believed that it seems nonsensical to say, for example, that two people could share a human soul (putting aside metaphorical speech). But that idea is neither nonsensical nor logically contradictory; it is simply incompatible with the doctrine of the human soul as found in most religions which assign each individual one soul. Second, and this is especially important, there is only one thing that has a fundamental influence on or is a determinant of the well-being of the individual human soul, namely, its relation to God. Thus neither other people's souls nor anything in the natural world can interfere with or otherwise condition the relationship between an individual soul and God. I want to argue, then, that economists' anti-pluralism regarding the atomist agent concept is analogous to religious fundamentalism regarding the individual soul. The argument makes two points: (a) that the atomistic individual doctrine operates as an untouchable conceptual structure in economics, and (b)
that it does so because it possesses the same features as religious doctrines that are analogous in form.
Then though the surface meanings of atomistic individual doctrine are specific to economics, its being an 'untouchable' in economics is due to its being treated as a fundamental, an underlying meaning associated with doctrines that are fundamental in other domains, such as the human soul doctrine.
Thus, I do not argue that the atomistic individual doctrine is actually derived from the human soul doctrine, or even that it stems from a similar psychological impulse, but rather that the two doctrines are structurally analogous.
Consider simply the parallels or structural similarities between the atomistic individual doctrine and the human soul doctrine. In the human soul doctrine the individual is essentially autonomous; similarly in the atomistic individual doctrine the individual is essentially autonomous. Further, in the human soul doctrine nothing in the natural world can limit the individuality of the human soul; similarly in the atomistic individual doctrine nothing in human psychology or social interaction can limit a person's essential individuality. Thus the two doctrines are homeomorphic or have the same structures. But while the human soul doctrine is rooted in the idea that people have an exclusive individual relationship to God, there is no evident reason from the perspective of ordinary reasoning about modeling practices in economics to think that the pattern of preferences that define an agent's individuality are exogenous.
Thus it is not implausible to say, based on the structural similarity of the two doctrines that the surface meaning of the atomistic individual doctrine employs a kind of human soul doctrine as its deeper meaning.
This argument, of course, does not prove that religious fundamentalism and the human soul doctrine provide the underlying meaning of the atomistic individual doctrine. Indeed I remain skeptical that arguments stronger than the suggestive ones above can be made. At the same time, they point to an issue that it seems ought to be addressed, namely, that the logical character of the atomistic individual doctrine bears a strong resemblance to religious argument in how they both follow out the implications of a basic set of assumptions, and that this is not in keeping with standard procedures for theoretical advance in science, including much of economics, which sets aside purely logical argument and tests the empirical standing of basic assumptions. At the very least, then, the arguments here are an invitation to proponents of the atomistic individual doctrine to explain their grounds for supposing individuals are essentially autonomous. That this explanation is likely not forthcoming, however, seems to confirm its role as an 'untouchable' in economics. One aspect of an institutionalized 'pluralism' built around specialization, then, is that it leaves much about the specialization to the specialist acting as a monopolist on the condition that the specialist and specialization are seen as having certain broadly acceptable features, such a set of conceptual constructs that are shared across fields. Thus every specialization possesses a domain of non-interference but also possesses certain shared entry points. My contention, thus, is that this combination promotes an intransigence regarding these shared constructs, since they are the means by which fields secure their domains of non-interference. An institutionalized 'pluralism' by fields, that is, ironically depends upon a rejection of pluralism regarding shared conceptual constructs which could well then have the effect of discouraging general pluralist discourse. In effect, the price of private 'pluralism' is public anti-pluralism.
This sort of explanation raises the question of why particular conceptual constructs become pivotal in sustaining private 'pluralism' and public anti-pluralism. This paper provides an explanation of how the atomistic individual doctrine could be thought to fulfill this pivotal shared construct role by explaining it as fundamentalist. The case for this fundamentalism rests on the parallel structures and functionalities of the atomistic individual doctrine and the individual soul doctrine, which clearly has the status of a fundamental doctrine in monotheistic religion. The argument was not, it should again be emphasized, that the atomistic individual doctrine is actually derived from the human soul doctrine. Rather as a shared construct in economics that operates as an 'untouchable' it must have the same characteristics as other doctrines that have this status. The human soul doctrine is a premier model in this regard, and consequently what makes it fundamental in religion provides guidelines for the underlying meaning of the atomistic individual doctrine that must be retained in its surface meanings.
Thus the atomistic individual doctrine appears to work quite like a kind of religious fundamentalism.
This still leaves unaddressed the two European students' question about US economists, religion, and pluralism. After all, specialization in economics and mainstream doctrines exist elsewhere as well. But they do seem to have been right on the mark in asking about the foundations of intolerance and what has been called here anti-pluralism.
